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ABSTRACT
While parental matchmaking has been widespread throughout history and across countries, we 
know little about the relationship between parental matchmaking and marriage outcomes. Does 
parental involvement in matchmaking help ensure their needs are better taken care of by married 
children?This paper finds supportive evidence using a survey of Chinese couples. In particular, 
parental involvement in matchmaking is associated with having a more submissive wife, a greater 
number of children, a higher likelihood of having any male children, and a stronger belief of the 
husband in providing old age support to his parents. These benefits, however, are achieved at the 
cost of less marital harmony within the couple and lower market income of the wife. The results 
render support to and extend the findings of Becker, Murphy and Spenkuch (2015) where parents 
meddle with children's preferences to ensure their commitment to providing parental goods such 
as old age support.
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1 Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Becker (1973, 1974), marriage formation is often modeled
as a matching process where males and females meet each other randomly or are assisted
by commercial agents (Weiss, 1997). This approach ignores a unique feature of marriage
matching: marriage is not simply of two individuals forming a new family; rather, it directly
aﬀects the welfare of their parents.
Many goods produced by the couple  including their labor market income, household
goods and services, children, and old age support  can be sharable and beneﬁcial to parents.
Old age support is a prominent example. Throughout history and in many developing
countries today, old age support depends critically on children (e.g., Cheung, 1972; Davidson
and Ekelund, 1997; Anderson, 2003). How can parents ensure that old age support will be
provided by children after they grow up? In traditional China, such provision was ensured by
parental ownership of children and the cultivation of ﬁlial piety (i.e., children submissiveness
to parents) (Cheung, 1972). In the modern world, Becker, Murphy and Spenkuch (2015)
(BMS 2015 hereafter) argue that, when old age support is mainly provided by adult children,
parents will put in resources to meddle with children's preferences and make them more
altruistic towards parents.
In this paper we show that, by having a say at the stage of spouse searching, parents may
be able to get a favorable provision of old age support and other parental goods from their
children. This is achieved by nudging the potential spouse choice towards what the parents
prefer in light of parental goods to be provided by the couple.
Parental goods refer to market or household goods and services directly consumed by
parents, either through household public goods or direct expenditure on parents. For exam-
ple, married children with high labor market incomes may give parents high income transfer
in various forms. Alternatively, children with a low market income may spend more time
providing household-produced goods and services (including companionship). A pleasant
personality of the spouse often becomes crucial in providing essential emotional and social
support for old parents. The presence of a large number of grandchildren may also be con-
sidered as an essential contribution of adult children to parental goods, and in particular,
having at least one male grandchild can oﬀer extra boost to their satisfaction. As put by
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Mencius, a key Chinese philosopher from 372-289 B.C., of the three deeds disrespectful to
parents, the worst is to bear no children.
Parental goods enter the utility function diﬀerently from the indirect component of the
utility through parental altruism towards children. For example, altruistic parents may derive
utility from having a happily married adult child, but the emotional attraction within the
couple is not a parental good. Indeed, parental matchmaking may involve a trade-oﬀ between
children's welfare and parental goods. In particular, parents who help in matchmaking expect
to have a long-term relationship with the couple, and these future interactions may distort
the incentive of matchmaking and, therefore, aﬀect the matching outcomes.
Consider a son who chooses between self and parental match-making. His satisfaction
with his spouse depends on expected marriage outcomes, including the couple's joint income,
household production, and love. In contrast, parents obtain a spillover from the couple's mar-
ket and household production, and being altruistic, they also obtain an altruistic component
originating from the son's welfare from the marriage.
Conﬂict of interest arises from the parents' keen interest in the couple's market and
household production. Parents who expect to receive parental goods from their son after
his marriage may care less about how attractive his wife is to him and how harmonious
the couple's married life will be, but more about how able she is in contributing to family
wealth, oﬀspring, old age support and other household production (Cheung, 1972). Parents
may also care more about the compatibility of the daughter-in-law's preference with their
needs, and therefore weigh their harmony with the daughter-in-law more heavily than the
harmony between the future couple. As a result, the best wife candidate in the eyes of
parents probably diﬀers from what is optimal to the son, even though parents are altruistic
and care about the son's welfare. Thus, parental matchmaking carries an agency cost for
the son, but it is beneﬁcial for parental welfare.
Without search costs, the son would prefer self search to avoid the agency cost in parental
matchmaking. However, parents and children diﬀer in search costs. On the one hand, parents
may face higher search costs for love within the potential couple than the son. On the other
hand, parents can have a wide access to potential candidates via their own social networks.
Parental search can be a greater advantage if parents are better at judging the candidate's
character and earning ability. Thus, despite the agency costs of parental matching, it is
sometimes optimal for the son to choose parental matchmaking because of the saving in
search costs.
We incorporate both agency costs and search costs into a theoretical framework, and
derive several testable implications. First, love in a marriage should be lower for parent-
involved matches than for self-matches. This is because parents value more than their son
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the monetary and household production components of his marriage, and they have a higher
marginal cost in assessing love within the couple. Due to the agency cost, the overall marriage
gain to the son, measured by love, income and household production but excluding search
cost, would be lower under parent-involved matches than self matches. However, the sharable
part of the marriage outcome could be lower or higher under parental matchmaking. It could
be higher because parents put more emphasis on sharable market and household production
than on love, and the wife who is picked by parents therefore tends to have a higher ability
to contribute to the sharable productions. It could be lower when parents overemphasize
goods produced within the household and the preservation of the old social structure at the
expense of market productivity. In this case, the couple's market income may be lower in
parent-involved matches, but key elements for household production such as the number of
children, willingness to provide old age support, and the submissiveness of the wife would
increase.
We take these predictions to a sample of 6,334 couples in 1991 from seven Chinese
provinces. In the sample, 48% of rural couples and 14.5% of urban couples were mar-
ried by parent-involved matchmaking; the rest by either self search or friend introduction
(both of which are referred to as self match). Comparison across parental and self matching
largely supports our theoretical predictions. In the full sample, parent-involved matches
yield lower marital harmony and lower couple income, but parent matches are more likely to
have submissive wives, less labor market participation of wives, lower wife income, a greater
number of children, a higher likelihood of having a boy, and a stronger belief of the husband
in providing old age support to his parents. In particular, when we allow parental match-
making to have diﬀerent eﬀects on couple incomes across urban and rural areas, its eﬀect is
positive for urban couples (as in Huang et al., 2012) but negative for rural couples. Many
household outcomes examined in this paper  fertility, old age support, and wife submis-
siveness  are more important in rural than urban areas, because rural areas have fewer job
market opportunities, provide less social support for the elderly, oﬀer less market provision
for services, and hold stronger beliefs on traditional family values. So rural parents may
emphasize women's contribution within the household more than market earnings.
Our work extends BMS (2015) in a few ways. BMS (2015) suggests that parents have
incentives to meddle with children's preferences in order to ensure their commitment to
providing old age support. Instead of using human capital investment as a tool to make
children more altruistic, we argue that parents can exert their inﬂuence even after the son
has grown up by actively involving in the searching process and the ﬁnal selection of the
potential daughter-in-law. In this sense, we take the son's schooling as predetermined while
focus on parents' incentive in matchmaking. Moreover, we extend parental consideration
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from old age support to all sorts of parental goods that could be beneﬁcial to parents.
Because diﬀerent parental goods may require diﬀerent traits of the daughter-in-law, it is an
interesting empirical question to assess how parental preference and the social environment
that shapes this preference aﬀect parental involvement in matchmaking.
In addition to extending BMS (2015) and Huang et al. (2012), this paper contributes
to the marriage literature by highlighting the economic trade-oﬀs in parental matchmaking.
Unlike the classical focus on the eﬀects of sex ratio (Angrist, 2002), divorce law (Chiappori,
2002), or educational composition on marriage outcomes, we show that the institutional
details of how the match is accomplished in the ﬁrst place also have important implications.1
In a related paper, Edlund and Lagerlof (2006) show that the shift from parental to individual
consent in marriage allows the young couple, instead of their parents, to receive the bride
price and thus facilitates economic growth. We diﬀer in that our focus is not on who controls
ﬁnancial resources in a marriage, but on who has more inﬂuence on the the choice of spouse.
The trade-oﬀ between love and money has also been explored by Fernandez et al. (2005), but
their perspective is of marriage sorting on skills and its relationship with income inequality;
they do not discuss matchmaking methods.2 Our paper is also related to Cheung (1972),
who argues that many traditional Chinese family practices,3 including marriage patterns,
are shaped by parental considerations to maximize family wealth, and that ﬁlial piety is
an endogenous belief that is conducive to the purpose of family wealth maximization. That
paper does not focus on the eﬀect of matchmaking methods; neither does it oﬀer econometric
evidence. Finally, our paper is related to the literature of inter-generational relationship and
old age support. Researchers have explored how inter-generational relationships aﬀect old
age support (see, for instance, Ikkink, Tilburg and Knipscheer, 1999; Hoﬀ, 2007). However,
none has explored the role that matchmaking methods play in facilitating old age support.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical in-
sights, Section 3 summarizes the data, and Section 4 presents the empirical results. A brief
conclusion is oﬀered in Section 5.
2 Theoretical Framework and Empirical Identiﬁcation
In this section, we ﬁrst present an agency model of parental matchmaking and then inter-
pret it in the context of parental goods. The last subsection discusses empirical implications
1Some other papers related to marriage include Zhang and Chan (1999), Foster and Rosenzweig (2000),
Chiappori et al. (2002), Suen, Chan and Zhang (2003), and Huang et al. (2009).
2See also Blood (1967) for descriptive analysis of love and arranged marriages.
3China-speciﬁc papers and books on marriage include Chao (1983), Xu and Whyte (1990), Cohen (1992),
and Zimmer and Kwong (2003), none of which examines how parental matchmaking aﬀects marriage out-
comes and how considerations of old age support aﬀect these eﬀects.
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and how we plan to test them with data.
2.1 Agency model of parental matching
Consider the marital decision of a young man, who has ﬁnished schooling and started working
to earn a living. The search process for a potential wife can either be conducted directly
by his parents or by himself. The process that yields a higher net expected utility to him
will be implemented. This setup is meant to capture the current practice in China, where
marriage in general cannot be forced upon a child by parents, and males are usually the ones
who initiate and propose marriage.4
2.1.1 Basic Set up
An individual's beneﬁt from marriage can be categorized into two dimensions: one is the
economic gain from joint household production and the other is emotional support from the
spouse. The total beneﬁt is aﬀected not only by the characteristics of husband and wife, but
also by their matching quality.
Let hm ≥ 0 denote the young man's human capital level, which aﬀects his earning and his
intra-household productivity. The human capital may capture, for example, his character,
innate ability, years of schooling, communication skills, and so on. Similarly, let hf ≥ 0
denote his potential wife's human capital level. Combined, hm and hf determine the total
marriage gains f(hf , hm), which reﬂects both the couple's household production output and
joint income earned from markets. We assume f(0, 0) > 0, fi > 0, fij > 0, and fii ≤ 0 for
i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Another key element in marriage is match quality, denoted by α which is idiosyncratic
to the couple and not readily observed by others; it can be interpreted as love or attraction
between two persons, which is often unpredictable based on commonly observed characteris-
tics. This implies that α can be treated as uncorrelated with hf . Given our assumption that
marriage is always implemented with mutual consent by the young couple, the emotional
output of marriage can be normalized as positive and α > 0 is assumed.5
For a young man with hm, the overall gain from marrying a wife with hf and α is
(β + α)f(hf , hm), where β > 0. The parameter β captures the husband's share of material
gain from the marriage, while α captures the degree of emotional beneﬁt.
4In modern China where our data are from, the son's consent is necessary for parents to be involved in
wife searching and parents can no longer force the son to accept their choice of daughter in law. The relevant
evidence from the data is discussed in Section 3.2. Having said that, modeling matchmaking means as the
choice of the son or the choice of his parents will yield the same qualitative results. A similar model can also
be used to study the search process of a young woman.
5This assumption is for simplicity only, as the same results can be derived for the case with α ≤ 0.
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The parents' gain from their son being married to a wife with characteristics (α, hf ) also
contains two parts: one is the public good component f(hf , hm) that generates a utility of
γ · f(hf , hm), which corresponds to all sorts of parental goods; the other is the altruistic
component δ(β + α)f(hf , hm) because they care about the welfare of their son, where γ > 0
and δ ∈ (0, 1). Since the love α between the husband and wife is by deﬁnition consumed
privately by the couple themselves, it does not aﬀect the parents' welfare directly. The wife's
characteristics that may aﬀect the whole family, such as pleasant personality and beauty,
are already indicated by the wife's human capital hf , which as mentioned earlier is broadly
deﬁned and not restricted to formal schooling.6
Marital search is costly. If searching himself, the son has to bear the search cost, which
is ηmc(α, hf , hm) > 0, where ηm, c1, c2 > 0 and c3, c31, c32 < 0. This means that it is more
costly for a man with a given hm to ﬁnd and persuade a woman with better quality (with
higher α or hf ) to become his wife, and the search cost for a wife of a given quality is lower
if the man's hm is higher. The parameter ηm denotes the eﬀect of some common elements on
the search cost by oneself for all individuals in a marriage market, and is thus not dependent
on idiosyncratic conditions of searching.
If the marriage is through parental search, parents will bear the search cost, which de-
pends on how intelligent they are in assessing α and how well they are connected with relevant
social networks that have access to potential candidates. The parents' degree of competence
in this matter is denoted by hp ≥ 0. The parental search cost is ηps(α, hf , hp) > 0, where
ηp, s1, s2 > 0 and s3, s31, s32 < 0. Similar to ηm, the parameter ηp denotes some common
factor that aﬀects the cost of searching by all parents. To capture the idea that the match
quality α is couple idiosyncratic, we assume that, in order to achieve the same level of α,
the parents' search cost cannot be too low compared with the direct search by their son, i.e.,
ηps1 ≥ δηmc1 for any given hm, hf , and hp.
A few comments on the model assumptions are in order. We assume the emotional
component of marital output (α) enters multiplicatively with the total output of the couple
(f(hf , hm)), in order to capture the possibility that marital harmony may aﬀect the pro-
ductivity of highly educated individuals to a greater extent, as creativity and precision in
job performance are relatively more easily reduced by emotional disturbances than manual
labor. In this sense, the emotional component and human capital are complements, which
is similar to a pattern in the business world where matching quality matters more for ﬁrms
with high-skilled working environment. The multiplicative assumption is not essential to our
main results; we have double checked the alternative setup where they are additive, and all
6Parents may have other gains from doing matchmaking than the elements already shown in the model;
as long as these concerns are not identical with those of their children, our main results should hold.
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predictions go through. If we do not adopt the multiplicative assumption, the assumption
c31 < 0 becomes essential to the sorting result presented below. In other words, c31 < 0 holds
if highly educated people have a greater social circle and hence more opportunities to meet
a potential spouse, or if they also have better capabilities to convince the spouse candidate
to marry them eventually. So even though their salary and hence opportunity cost per hour
is high, the fact that they may spend much less time in wooing the potential spouse is likely
to reduce their overall searching cost. For example, the potential cost for a Forrest Gump to
convince an attractive woman to marry him can be much higher than that for a Bill Gates.
In short, for the model to carry through, we need either the multiplicative assumption or
the assumption of c31 being negative, but not necessarily both.
Another key assumption lies in the non-transferability of search cost. The cost in ﬁnding a
potential spouse, though containing a monetary and material component that is transferable,
has a substantial part that is diﬃcult to transfer between parents and children. For example,
one often gets to know a potential spouse through social gatherings and events, and this
means that the son or the parents have to participate themselves by spending time, eﬀort,
and other expenditure that are not easily transferable. And usually such social occasions are
organized around their own social networks such as friends and coworkers, which are simply
not accessible by others in the family. The time, eﬀort, and gifts required in maintaining
ongoing social networks and events are not easily transferable. If the son conducts the
search himself, he has to spend his own eﬀort and incur expenditures that can't simply be
compensated by his parents. Similarly, if parents conduct the search, they will rely on their
friends and relatives with whom the son may not be familiar. The model captures this non-
transferable part while leaving the transferable part as a common component that will drop
out in search cost comparison.
2.1.2 The Son's Optimal Choice of Search Methods
The son decides whether to search for his marriage partner himself or to delegate the search
to his parents. If he searches himself, his objective function is
U∗ ≡ max
α,hf
(β + α)f(hf , hm)− ηmc(α, hf , hm).
The corresponding optimal choices of his potential wife's characteristics that result from
searching by himself are denoted by α∗ and h∗f , which are characterized by the following ﬁrst
order conditions
f(h∗f , hm)− ηmc1(α∗, h∗f , hm) = 0, (1)
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(β + α∗)f1(h∗f , hm)− ηmc2(α∗, h∗f , hm) = 0. (2)
If his parents manage the search, their objective function is
U˜ ≡ max
α,hf
[γ + δ(β + α)]f(hf , hm)− ηps(α, hf , hp),
where the corresponding optimal choices are denoted by α∗∗ and h∗∗f . The necessary condi-
tions that characterize α∗∗ and h∗∗f are
δf(h∗∗f , hm)− ηps1(α∗∗, h∗∗f , hp) = 0, (3)
[γ + δ(β + α∗∗)]f1(h∗∗f , hm)− ηps2(α∗∗, h∗∗f , hp) = 0. (4)
It is easy to see that in general the optimal wives are diﬀerent between these two search
processes.
Then the son's choice problem is max{U∗;U∗∗}, where
U∗ ≡ (β + α∗)f(h∗f , hm)− ηmc(α∗, h∗f , hm);U∗∗ ≡ (β + α∗∗)f(h∗∗f , hm), (5)
and the second term is the son's net utility when his parents do the search for him. Searching
by himself will prevail if U∗ ≥ U∗∗, while his parents will be delegated to do the search if the
opposite U∗ < U∗∗ is true.7 The main implications of the optimal solution to this problem
are summarized by the following propositions (see Appendix A for proof):
Proposition1: Eﬀects of Parental Matchmaking: The emotional output and the
overall marriage gain to the son are lower under parental involvement, i.e., α∗f(h∗f , hm) >
α∗∗f(h∗∗f , hm) and (β + α
∗)f(h∗f , hm) ≥ (β + α∗∗)f(h∗∗f , hm) hold, respectively. But it is
possible that the couple's joint household production is higher, i.e., f(h∗f , hm) ≤ f(h∗∗f , hm)
may be true.
Proposition2: Adverse Selection of the Son: There exists a unique threshold value
h#m of the son's human capital level such that he will choose to search for a marriage partner
himself if hm ≥ h#m, while delegate his parents to do the search for him if hm < h#m. The
threshold h#m increases with hp, γ and ηm.
Proposition3 : Positive Selection of Parents: There exists a unique threshold value
h#p of the parents' competence level such that they will be delegated to do the search iﬀ
hp > h
#
p , where h
#
p increases with hm but decreases with γ and ηm.
7If parents can arrange the marriage without consent from the son, as is the case in traditional society, the
parents are the ﬁnal decision maker and their objective function would be max{[γ+δ(β+α∗)]f(h∗f , hm); [γ+
δ(β + α∗∗)]f(h∗∗f , hm)− ηps(α∗∗, h∗∗f , hp)}.
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These propositions suggest that the eﬀects of parental involvement in marriage search can
be diﬀerent for the two dimensions of marriage output: it is always negative for the emotional
output, which is driven by the fact that the matching quality  love α  is idiosyncratic to
the couple and thus not easily observed or shared by others; the eﬀect on the sharable
output, however, can be either negative or positive. The reason for a positive eﬀect is that
the household output can be shared among family members and thus parents have more
incentives to care about the potential wife's human capital. On the other hand, parental
involvement could have a negative eﬀect on the economic output and is still an optimal
choice from the son's perspective if parental matchmaking leads to substantial savings in
search cost.
Propositions 1-3 also suggest that parental involvement in marital search is endogenous
to individual attributes. It is more likely to happen when the son's human capital level hm
is lower or the searching cost ηm is higher, or when his parents beneﬁt more from parental
goods (when γ is higher) and have lower searching costs (when hp is higher and ηp is lower).
In other words, in a given marriage market, there are two sources of self-selection in the
choice of marital search methods: one is from the son and the other is from the parents;
a young man with a lower human capital, or with parents that are more capable or more
motivated is more likely to rely on parental search.
Figure 1 illustrates the positive relationship between h#m and h
#
p and how their combina-
tion aﬀects the endogenous choice of marital searching methods. In the graph, a young man
with human capital h
′
m and parents' eﬀectiveness h
′
p, for example, will optimally choose to
rely on his parents to search for a potential wife because his human capital is lower than
the threshold level h#m corresponding to his parents' eﬀectiveness h
′
p. This choice can also be
understood from the alternative perspective: given his human capital level h
′
m, his parents
are competent enough (since h′p is higher than the corresponding threshold level h
#
p ) to ﬁnd
a good wife for him so that he does not bother to search by himself.
2.2 Parental Goods Concerns In Spouse Selection
The above agency model is based on the child's perspective, that is, it is his decision to
choose self search or parental search. In this subsection, we interpret the model from the
parents' perspective, especially in light of the parental goods they expect to obtain from the
son's marriage.
In the scenario where the son entrusts the parents to do the marital search for him,
what would be the parents' deliberations? Since parental goods may include both ﬁnancial
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support and various non-ﬁnancial home services from the married couple, attributes that
can contribute to these production abilities, for example schooling for labor income and
submissiveness for home services, will be favored under parental matchmaking. Parental
deliberations become complicated if diﬀerent types of parental goods require conﬂicting
traits of the daughter-in-law. For example, bearing more children and doing more household
chores often require the daughter-in-law to devote less time and eﬀort to her career outside
home. This trade-oﬀ is especially pronounced if the market is not developed well enough
to provide household services at an aﬀordable price. In that situation, which applies to
many rural or economically less developed urban areas in China, parents may prefer a home-
oriented, submissive daughter-in-law to someone else who is highly educated and career-
driven. Conversely, in large cities, the market may oﬀer women more job opportunities
and allow them to use labor market income to purchase food preparation, child care, and
old age support from the market. The substitutability between labor market income and
household service could induce parents to prefer a daughter-in-law with labor market skills
at the expense of domesticity.
Fertility choice entails a special note. Though China has adopted the one-child policy
since early 1980s, enforcement has been looser in rural areas. One reason is that rural labor
is an important input for agricultural production, and without access to pension and health
insurance, having a greater number of children is an important way to ensure old age support.
Having at least one boy is especially important because a woman usually moves out of her
own home and marries into her husband's family (Cheung, 1972). Even if the couple live on
their own, they often live closer to the husband's parents, which explains why it is often the
husband's parents who ﬁnance and build a new home for the newly wed couple. Traditional
family values also require the couple to produce household services for the husband's parents
and raise oﬀspring who carry the husband's last name. For the same reason, traditionally
only sons can inherit parents' property (Cheung, 1972). This tradition has faded away in
large cities, but it still persists in rural and less developed areas. Furthermore, enforcing the
one-child policy is more diﬃcult in rural areas: while urban employers, especially state-owned
enterprises and government units, can credibly threaten to demote, ﬁne, or even ﬁre those
who attempt to have more than one child, such threats are not credible in rural areas. Thus,
urban residents have little choice in the number or gender of children, but rural residents, if
they want, can have more children than urban couples.
In short, in rural and less developed areas, the lack of government support for the elderly,
the missing market for household services, and traditional family values will all motivate
parents to demand a daughter-in-law who is more home-oriented and willing to raise at least
one boy. In contrast, with less freedom in fertility, parents in more developed urban areas may
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resort to other means to ensure parental goods from their children, for example, aiming for
higher education and higher couple income, even if that means less adherence to traditional
values.8 We thus expect more parental matchmaking in rural and less-developed areas, and
such parental matchmaking should have a positive eﬀect on the number of children, the
likelihood of having at least one boy, and the submissiveness of the daughter-in-law.
Tying back to our theoretical model, a greater reliance on adult children for parental
goods can be interpreted as parents putting more weight on the couple's sharable produc-
tion relative to the son's welfare (i.e. higher γ). This implies greater agency cost under
parental matching, as the wife candidates ﬁltered by parents will demonstrate more at-
tributes preferable by the parents for their consumption of parental goods (∂h∗∗f /∂γ > 0
mathematically).
If there are multiple parental goods and some parental goods are more crucially dependent
on the couple than on the market, we can extend the model to include two sets of couple
output (e.g. f1(hf , hm) for children and household service and f2(hf , hm) for labor market
income) and allow parents to put more weight on one set than the other (e.g. γ1 > γ2). In
that case, parents will be more eager to look for a daughter-in-law who has favorable traits
to deliver f1 even if that implies less f2.
So far we assume that the son cares only about his own welfare while parents are altruistic,
following the standard assumption in Becker's Rotten Kids Theorem (Becker, 1981). BMS
(2015) argue that parents have incentives to manipulate the son's preference when he was
young so that he is more altruistic towards the parents' old age support when he grows
up. This is consistent with the traditional values of Chinese families such as ﬁlial piety,
which emphasizes that it is the son's duty to continue the surname by having children
(especially boys), to be submissive to parents in general, and to take care of parents when
they are old (Cheung, 1972). If the son's altruism is incorporated into our model, the son's
preference will be more aligned with the parent's preference (e.g. allow β to increase with γ).
Not only does this reduce the agency cost of parental matchmaking (thus leading to more
parental matchmaking), but it also encourages the son to choose a wife closer to the parents'
preferences even if he decides to search by himself. BMS (2015) thus reconﬁgure the forces
8There are other factors to consider when discussing the eﬀect of parental matchmaking on the number
of children. Parents may view too many children as competition for the limited resources that the couple
have. In other words, what grandchildren have, the grandparents have not. On the other hand, grandparents
tend to enjoy the companion and even household production from grandchildren (e.g., fetching water where
there is no indoor water), and this would result in a positive relationship between parental matchmaking
and the number of children for the couple. The overall eﬀect of parental matchmaking on the number of
children may therefore be ambiguous. However, since children are less costly to raise in rural areas due to
inter-generational cohabitation, the competition eﬀect should be weaker in rural areas, again pushing for a
more positive and pronounced relationship between parental matchmaking and the number of children in
rural areas.
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underlying the costs and beneﬁts of parental matchmaking so that the beneﬁts now loom
larger, and parents' demand for certain traits  say, submissiveness of the daughter-in-law
and her willingness to raise at least one boy  is more likely to win out in the end. It also
renders the son more willing to delegate the search to parents. However, allowing the parents
to instill in their son an altruistic feeling towards them only mitigates the agency cost in
parental matchmaking; as long as there is a wedge between the son and his parents' utility
functions, our main results hold.
2.3 Identiﬁcation Issues
We have argued that some conﬂict of interest may arise between parents and son because
parents rely on their married son for sharable household production, but love is largely
private consumption within the couple.9 This conﬂict of interest, combined with search cost
in the marriage market, leads to an interesting relationship among parental matchmaking,
husband's belief about old age support, wife characteristics, and marriage outcomes such
as love, joint couple income, wife's labor participation status, and the number of children.
The main insight is that parents involved in matchmaking prefer a wife good at providing
sharable production, even if such preferences lead to less love within the couple. However,
a challenge to the test of this prediction is the son's endogenous choice of the matchmaking
method. In particular, the choice of search method may not only be aﬀected by random
elements, but also by the son's and his parents' characteristics as reﬂected by the adverse
and positive selection problems in the above propositions.
If we can perfectly control parents' characteristics (hp, γ), then the average marital quality
of husbands with parental involvement must be lower than others even when their wives are
of the same quality because the husbands in the parent-matched group have lower human
capital (hm < h
#
m); this is the adverse selection eﬀect of sons. In contrast, when the husband's
characteristics are fully controlled, those with parental involvement must have had more
competent parents (hp > h
#
p ) with respect to searching, which implies that their wife's
overall quality, especially their human capital level h∗∗f , may be higher than others', and
hence their marital quality may also be higher; this is the positive selection eﬀect of parents.
Thus, without properly accounting for these two sources of the endogeneity problem, the
OLS estimated coeﬃcient of parental matchmaking can be either higher or lower than the
true eﬀect, depending on which selection issue is dominant.
Our approach to address this challenge is to use instrumental variables that aﬀect the
9That love is a private good is nicely illustrated by an episode of Seinfeld. Jerry and Elaine, once lovers
and then friends for a long time, became lovers again. Witnessing Jerry and Elaine's intimate behavior,
Kramer, Jerry's old friend and neighbor, blurts out, I liked you two so much more when you were friends!
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choice of search method but not wife characteristics and marital outcomes directly. The ﬁrst
instrument derives from social norms. Consider two identical marriage markets A and B
that are mutually exclusive. Due to some exogenous shocks, the threshold level of the son's
human capital h#m, a function of parents' characteristics hp, shifts down in market A but not
in B. This can be achieved in the model, for example, by a lower ηm, which aﬀects the search
costs of all individuals in a marriage market. As shown in Figure 1, this downward shift
in market A will induce a group of young men who are between the new and old threshold
curves to change their search method from parental involvement to self search. As a result,
identical individuals make diﬀerent choices: those in market B have parental involvement,
while those in market A adopt self-search. Comparing their diﬀerence in wife characteristics
and marital outcomes will ﬁlter out the endogeneity in the choice of search method driven
by the son or the parents' individual characteristics.
Empirically, for a husband born in year t, we construct the instrument for his choice of
parental matchmaking as the percent of other husbands of similar ages in the same market
who chose parental matchmaking. Here we deﬁne a market by the interaction of province
dummy and rural dummy. A similar age cohort is deﬁned as those born in the same year or
one to three years earlier. Admittedly, this market-level instrument may capture local culture
and tradition that aﬀect people's choice of spouse and style of married life. Unfortunately,
such culture and tradition evolve slowly, so that the main variations in our instrumental
variable are cross-sectional. This implies that we cannot include provincial ﬁxed eﬀects
without swamping the power of instrument, but we do control for average income and average
schooling at the district level in urban areas and the township level in rural areas.10 In this
sense, our instrument is good at ﬁltering out individual-level selections as articulated in the
above propositions, but it may pick up unobserved local culture and tradition independent
of average income or schooling in local city/township.
In particular, we estimate the following speciﬁcation:
Yim = α0 + β1 · ParentMatchedim + β2 · Zim + β3 · Zm + i
where for husband i in market m, Yim denotes marital outcomes, wife characteristics, and
husband i's belief in old age support; Zim denotes husband's observable characteristics such as
age, religion, schooling, party membership, and parents' schooling; Zm denotes whether m is
rural and the average income and schooling at district/township level; and ParentMatchedim
is a dummy variable indicating whether i's parents were involved in the search for his wife.
The instrument that captures the norm of parental matchmaking in market m is denoted as
10The district level in urban areas is one level below the county-level city in China's administrative ladder.
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ParentMatchedm.
While ParentMatchedm ﬁlters out individual-level unobservable attributes, it also intro-
duces a general equilibrium problem, that is, the eﬀect of ParentMatchedm on one individual
may be oﬀset by that on another individual in the same marriage market so that the eﬀect of
the norm may reﬂect spurious correlation due to the omission of other market-level variables.
Take wife schooling as an example. Let us assume that every girl has completed her school-
ing before entering the marriage market and every girl is eventually married. If we compare
two marriage markets with exactly the same distribution of girl schooling, then the average
wife schooling must be equal regardless of which market uses more parental matchmaking.
A shift in ParentMatchedm will only aﬀect who matches with whom, not the market-wide
average. In reality, the market with a higher ParentMatchedm may be associated with
lower average wife schooling for other reasons, for example, such a market may also have an
unobserved culture to discourage girl schooling. In this situation, using ParentMatchedm
as an instrument may pick up this unobserved culture but does not support the argument
that parents prefer a less educated daughter-in-law.
To address the potential general equilibrium problem, we need individual-level variations
in the instrument. One solution is interacting the market-wide social norm (ParentMatchedm)
with some individual-level variable, say husband schooling (hm). According to our model,
although social norm does not aﬀect the average wife schooling based on a predetermined
wife schooling distribution, it does aﬀect the assortative matching between husband school-
ing and wife schooling. Therefore, even if ParentMatchedm alone captures some unob-
served cultural factor beyond our model, using ParentMatchedm · him as instruments for
ParentMatchedim ·him will shed light on the eﬀect of parental matchmaking on the matching
pattern of husband and wife schooling.
Again partly to address the general equilibrium problem, our second main instrument is
a pure individual-level instrument based on the characteristics of the husband's ﬁrst job.11
Since the vast majority of husbands should have obtained their ﬁrst jobs before dating, the
nature of the ﬁrst job may aﬀect the husband's own social circle and therefore his search
cost before marriage, but it should not aﬀect the couple's marriage outcomes directly at
the time of survey after we control for the husband's current job status.12 Empirically, we
deﬁne a dummy for whether an urban husband's ﬁrst job was in a state-owned enterprise
and another dummy for whether a rural husband's ﬁrst job was in a township and village
enterprise. Both dummies are referred to as Job0. In the empirical section, we provide a
11We thank one referee for inspiring us to look at the husband's ﬁrst job as an individual-level instrument.
12We have tested this argument empirically. When we include both ﬁrst job and current job in the OLS
regressions, the coeﬃcients on the ﬁrst job variables are not statistically signiﬁcant.
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number of tests for the validity and power of Job0 and ParentMatchedm as instruments.
It is worth noting that the general equilibrium concern is more severe for wife schooling
than for other marriage outcomes, as most girls have completed education before marriage,
and hence the distribution of wife schooling is largely pre-determined. In contrast, joint
couple income, wife's labor participation, wife submissiveness, fertility outcome, or even the
husband's belief in old age support can be inﬂuenced by parental preference after marriage,
and their average may therefore diﬀer from one market to another even if all markets start
with the same distribution of wife characteristics. In other words, social norm (as proxied by
ParentMatchedm) could have a causal eﬀect on these other marriage outcomes according
to our theoretical model, even if its identiﬁcation relies on cross-market comparison.
3 Data and Measurements
3.1 Data Source
We use the Study of the Status of Contemporary Chinese Women (SSCCW), a data-set col-
lected jointly by the Population Institute of Chinese Academy of Social Science and the Pop-
ulation Council of United Nations in 1991 (Institute of Population Studies, 1993). SSCCW
collects information on personal traits, marriage characteristics, fertility, work, intra-family
arrangements, and gender norms. The survey used stratiﬁed random sampling to select
households from one municipality (Shanghai) and 6 provinces (Guangdong, Sichuan, Jilin,
Shandong, Shanxi, and Ningxia) scattered across China in the southeast, south, southwest,
northeast, east, middle and north, respectively. As migration across diﬀerent provinces was
not common in China by 1991, each province can be regarded as a separate marriage market.
Another important dimension that cuts across areas is the urban-rural distinction. The rigid
Hukou system eﬀectively blocked people from migrating between cities and the countryside
at the time of the survey. Furthermore, although our data consist of married couples only,
we do not face much selection in divorce. The divorce rate around our sample period was
only 0.71 per 1000 couples, far below the corresponding numbers in many countries in 1995,
which are 4.44 in the U.S. and 1.59 in Japan (Zeng and Wu, 2000).
SSCCW interviewed husbands and wives separately. Here we focus on the male sample
because a Chinese couple tends to live with the husband's parents by tradition (if they live
with any parent at all), and the paternal parents therefore have stronger incentives to value
a marriage candidate's ability in economic and home production. Our sample thus consists
of husbands. Wife characteristics will be examined as dependent variables, as they are the
result of the choice of the husband (and his parents if they were involved in the search
16
process).
3.2 Key Variables
The question on matchmaking methods asked how an individual met his or her spouse
initially. There are four original categories in the data: introduced by parents or relatives, by
friends, by themselves, and by other means. We deﬁne a dummy of ParentMatched equal
to one if the husband has been matched by the introduction of parents or relatives and 0 if
otherwise. We cannot distinguish parents from relatives partly because the distinction is not
available in the data, partly because relatives are an integrated part of the parents' social
networks to facilitate the search process. A perhaps more debatable decision is that we do not
diﬀerentiate couples initially introduced by friends from those who met by themselves. The
reason is that these two groups are similar: in both cases, it is the young people themselves,
not their parents, who conducted the search process and bore the search cost. And indeed,
our empirical explorations suggest that these two groups are very similar.
The survey also asked whether the marriage decision was made by self or parents. Sub-
jects were asked to choose from self decision, parental consent, self decision, parental
disapproval, self decision, parental consent on both sides, self decision, parental disap-
proval on both sides, parental decision, self indiﬀerent, parental decision, self consent and
parental decision, self consent by force. Answer to this question diﬀers greatly by whether
ParentMatched is equal to one. For the sample of husbands, 33.8% of them had parental
matchmaking. Among those parent-matched marriages, 26.6% were parental decision rather
than self decision. In comparison, only 6.9% of self matched marriages were parental deci-
sion. But most parent-decided marriages have the answers of either I consented (78%) or
I was indiﬀerent to self decision or parent decision (18.6%). Only 3.4% of them fall in the
category of it was parental decision, and I was forced to agree. This is consistent with our
model assumption that parents cannot force a marriage on an adult son in modern China.
Rural parents play a more important role in their children's marriage life than urban parents,
as reﬂected in our data: 48% of our rural couples were married via parental matchmaking,
while this percentage is only 14.5% for urban couples. Moreover, 30.5% of parent-matched
husbands had their marriage decided by their parents in rural areas, as compared to 13.8%
in urban areas.
From a husband's perspective, marriage outcomes are represented by love, joint income,
non-marketable household production, wife traits, the number and gender composition of
children. Given the diﬃculty to quantify love, we follow Huang, Jin and Xu (2012) to
proxy the emotional dimension of marriage by an indicator of harmony within a couple.
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The survey question most closely related to the emotional aspect of marriage asked: "How
do you usually reconcile with your spouse when you have conﬂicts?" We deﬁne a harmony
index as follows: it is equal to 2 if the couple reported no conﬂicts, 1 if conﬂicts are usually
solved by mutual compromise, and 0 if conﬂicts are solved by either unilateral compromise
or third-party mediation by family members, relatives or friends. Third-party involvement
in conﬂict solution is a rare event in the data (only 3% reported so) so we do not distinguish
it from unilateral compromise. The implication is that "no conﬂicts" is the best outcome,
while "mutual compromise" comes next in the ranking, which is arguably less costly or
more eﬀective than unilateral compromise and third-party mediation. Mutual compromise
is better than unilateral compromise also because constant reliance on unilateral compromise
eventually leads to resentment and the loss of love. In our view, this harmony index captures
the essential meaning of a couple's matching quality: couples with better matching quality
are less likely to have conﬂicts and more capable of solving conﬂicts in an eﬀective way.
Though imperfect, the above-mentioned harmony index is a more appropriate measure of
the emotional output of marriage in our context than others used in the literature. In modern
western societies, for example, whether a marriage ends up in divorce is a natural measure
of marital quality. The extremely low divorce rate in China by 1991, along with the fact
that our data cover married couples only, however, renders this measure less useful.
Joint couple income is measured by the summation of the annual incomes of the husband
and of the wife. This is a measure for the market component of marriage gains. Keep in
mind that maximized couple income could be achieved either by both working for market
incomes or by specialization, that is, one works for the market while the other specializes in
household production.
Wife's labor participation status (at the time of survey) is deﬁned separately for urban
and rural areas. In urban areas, there is an explicit question on whether the wife has any
job outside home. In rural areas, one question asked about a rural wife's main labor type:
household chores, agriculture, household husbandry, household processing, household craft,
individual peddler, township and village enterprises, and other. However, household chores
can entail a large account of income, as high as 3,000 yuan per year at the 95% percentile
and 11,700 yuan at the maximum. Thus we suspect some respondents have included some
market-oriented activities in household chores. To be safe, we classify whether a rural wife
was working in the labor market based on whether her annual income is above 1,500 yuan.
This deﬁnition is very much correlated with the reported labor type: for those who reported
household chores as the main labor type, 35% is labeled work by our 1500-yuan deﬁnition;
in contrast, of those who reported anything other than household chores as the main labor
type, 67% is labeled work by our deﬁnition. Later on we have also used above-1000 yuan
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as an alternative deﬁnition for rural wife's labor participation status and ﬁnd robust results.
A signiﬁcant share of residents, especially the rural ones, rely on adult children for old
age support. On the question of what do you expect to get from your son when you
grow old? 4.6% of urban husbands answered ﬁnancial support, 43.5% answered home
services, 38.2% answered emotional support, and 13.2% answered that they expected nothing.
In comparison, 19.8% of rural husbands expected ﬁnancial support from their sons, 67%
expected home services, 9.1% expected emotional support, and only 3.8% reported that
they expected nothing. Similar patterns occur on a parallel question of what do you expect
to get from your daughter when you are old? but both urban and rural husbands expected
more emotional support from their daughters (41.5% in urban and 29.8% in rural), and
less ﬁnancial support (2.4% urban, 11.5% rural) than from sons. On home services, urban
husbands expected about same home services from daughters (44%) as from sons (43.5%),
while rural husbands expected less home services from daughters (51.4%) than from sons
(67%).
Consistent with our discussion that wives are key for providing various home services
including services related to old age support, we ﬁnd that wives are likely to contribute
more to old age support than husbands inside the household. The SSCC survey asked urban
husbands and wives separately on who is the main provider of certain types of house work,
including home service to the elderly. Conditional on existing need of home service to the
elderly, 40% of husbands and 57% of wives said they were the main service provider in the
house. Husbands seem to exaggerate their role as the main contributor: while only 39%
of husbands admitted that their wives being the main provider of old age support, 57% of
wives claiming themselves being the main provider. Similarly, 23% of wives credited their
husbands as the main contributor of old age support in the house, while 40% of husbands
credited as such themselves. Unfortunately, this question was not asked in the rural sample,
but rural couples were more likely to live with the husband's parents at the time of marriage
(59% rural, 31% urban, according to husband's answer), and it is quite rare to live with the
wife's parents in both rural and urban areas (5% rural, 6% urban, according to husband's
answer). At the time of the survey, fewer rural couples were still living with the husband's
parents (29% rural and 39.9% urban), but this is partly because more rural parents have
passed away, and rural parents have more children to live with so that the probability of
living with a particular child would be lower.
To recap, the survey data conﬁrm that parents, especially rural parents, rely on their
adult children for old age support, and old age support is typically provided by son and
daughter-in-law. Within the couple, the wife is more likely to provide home services to the
elderly if such need arises. All these suggest that parents have strong incentives to participate
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in the choice of their daughter-in-law, especially in rural areas.
Because old age support in the household is usually provided by the wife, its eﬀective
delivery requires values and beliefs conforming to a traditional society. Indeed, for thousands
of years in Chinese history, a top value for children is ﬁlial piety (Cheung, 1972), which
emphasizes being obedient and submissive to parents. Interestingly, the second Chinese
character in the term ﬁlial piety, xiao shun, literally means being submissive and following
orders of parents. This is especially important for picking a wife for the son: the son
was already trained to be obedient to parents within the household for all the growing-up
years, but the wife will join the family as an adult and it may be diﬃcult to train her to
be submissive after marriage. Thus, matchmaking parents would prefer to select a young
woman who has already submitted to those submissive values and is more malleable to the
happiness of the husband's parents.
To measure the submissiveness of the wife, we rely on three speciﬁc measures and one
aggregate measure. First, Wife Career Unimportant is a dummy variable indicating an
answer in agreement to the following statement: a wife's career achievement should not
exceed that of her husband. This indicates conformity to the traditional value of superiority
of man over woman (Cheung, 1972), and makes husbands' wishes easier to carry through in
the family. Second, No Good Male Friend is a dummy variable indicating the belief that a
married woman should not have a good male friend. Again, this is a preventive belief that
helps to maintain the value of parental investment in picking a submissive and cooperative
wife for their son. With such a belief, there is a much lower chance of marriage disruption,
and parental investment in picking the right wife would have a longer horizon to bear fruit.
This is very similar to what Cheung (1972) interpreted about the Chinese marriage practice
of blind marriage (i.e., groom and bride were supposed to meet each other for the ﬁrst
time upon the completion of the procedure on the wedding day): it disallows a young man's
love for beauty to stand in the way of maximizing family wealth via arranged marriages.
Third, Cannot Reject Sex is a dummy variable that is based on the following question: do
you think a wife can reject her husband's request for sex? 1. yes, 2. no, 3. yes but hard
to get it accomplished. If the answers are 2 and 3, then the dummy Cannot Reject Sex
takes the value of one. Finally, the three measures are summed into an aggregate index,
Wife Submissiveness. Clearly, a higher value of Wife Submissiveness implies a wife who is
more submissive, easier to govern, and more conducive to parents' old age support. As a
comparison, we also measure wife traits by wife schooling. Since highly educated women often
have their own ideas and face more job and social opportunities outside home, parents may
face a tradeoﬀ between having a highly educated daughter-in-law and having a submissive
one.
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We also measure the husband's belief in providing old age support. Having such a belief
is a key part of BMS (2015): to ensure old age support, parents invest resources in manip-
ulating children's preferences so that they are more altruistic toward the parents. Because
we argue that parental matchmaking leads to a better fulﬁllment of parents' agenda which
includes old age support, we follow BMS (2015) to examine whether parental matchmaking
is systematically associated with the son having stronger preferences for providing old age
support. One survey question asked: in your view, what is the best way to allocate house-
hold assets? 1. to distribute evenly among sons and daughters, 2. mainly to sons, 3. mainly
to daughters, 4. to the sons or daughters that provide old age support. When the answer
is 4, the newly created dummy variable, Providing Old Age Support, is set equal to 1.
One may argue that Providing Old Age Support can be interpreted as a measure of
incentives rather than preferences for providing old age support. We however interpret it
mainly as a belief: the wording is not about whether the husband in our survey had received
an ex-ante oﬀer of inheritance conditional on providing old age support. Such contracts are
uncommon and unenforceable in China. Rather, the question is among a long list of belief
questions, and it is worded as whether the surveyed husband would reward the care-giving
children for providing old age support to him. When the husband believes that providers of
old age support deserve more household assets, two scenarios are likely: either the responding
husband inherently believes in the moral value of adult children providing old age support,
or his parents (or the local community) have instilled this value in him. Either way, those
believing in Providing Old Age Support tend to have a stronger belief in the duty of adult
children in providing old age support to their parents.
We measure the couple's fertility outcome by their number of children at time of survey,
whether the number of children is above three, and whether the couple have at least one son.
We choose three as the cutoﬀ because rural areas do not enforce the one-child policy strictly
if the ﬁrst child is a girl, hence it is common to have two children in a rural household.
Having three or more requires more determination and more ﬁnancial resources to pay a ﬁne
for violating the one-child policy.
As stated in Section 2, social norm ParentMatchedm is measured by the proportion
of parent-matched couples in a marriage market deﬁned by province, urban/rural, and age
cohort. Age cohorts are deﬁned as those at the same age or up to three years older. The
other instrument, Job0, includes two dummies: one for whether an urban husband's ﬁrst job
was in a state-owned enterprise and the other for whether a rural husband's ﬁrst job was in a
township and village enterprise. We control for husband's schooling, age, mother schooling,
father schooling, membership of Communist Party and current job status. The current job
status includes ten dummies: for an urban husband, we code whether his current job is a
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state-owned enterprise, a collective ﬁrm, a privately owned ﬁrm, a foreign ﬁrm or a ﬁrm of
other ownership types; for a rural husband, we code whether his current job is in household
production, farming, household non-agricultural activities, a township and village enterprise,
or other activities. At the district/township level, we control for log income per capita and
average schooling. Whether the area is urban or rural is absorbed by the husband's current
job status.
3.3 Sample and Summary Statistics
As detailed in Section 2, parental matchmaking is subject to individual-level selection,
and our instruments include the local norm of parental matchmaking. As a result, we need
a sample suﬃciently large to compute the norm in each province-urban-age cell where age
refers to the same age as or up to three years older than the survey respondent. We thus
delete any province-urban-age cells that contain fewer than 35 observations. The number of
35 is somewhat arbitrary, but it ensures a reasonable number of observations to compute the
mean (excluding oneself), while at the same time not losing too many observations of the
sample. This restriction leads to a sample with males no older than early 50s at the time
of survey (1990). Dropping old males has an added beneﬁt: the individuals who remain in
our sample do need to consider old age support for their parents, which suits the purpose of
this paper. In total, we have 6,334 husbands in the analysis sample, 57.6% of whom lived in
rural areas at the time of survey.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the pooled sample ﬁrst, and then parent-
matched and self-matched samples separately. Column 4 presents the diﬀerence between the
parent-matched and self-matched couples, along with the standard deviation and t-statistics
of the mean comparison. Overall, 33.8% of couples were formed via parental matchmaking,
but rural couples relied on parents for matching much more frequently (48% vs. 14.5%).
Relative to self-matched couples, the parent-matched are less harmonious, more likely to
have conﬂicts, and have lower combined income. Husbands in parent-matched marriages
have signiﬁcantly lower schooling (by 1.6 years), signiﬁcantly less educated parents (by 1-2
years), and are less likely to be a Communist Party member, which is associated with higher
earning power (Li et al., 2007). While these attributes are consistent with the selection
story  less desirable men are more likely to get help from parents in spouse searching
 parent-matched husbands actually get married 1.6 years younger than the self-matched.
One possible explanation is that they are subject to more traditional family values and face
more pressure to marry early. This is conﬁrmed by diﬀerent strengths of parental matching
norm (0.45 for parent-matched couples and 0.3 for self-matched couples). Consistent with
our prediction, parent-matched husbands also tend to have more children (1.895 vs. 1.518)
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and a higher likelihood to have at least one son (0.753 vs. 0.637). Urban husbands were less
likely to start the ﬁrst job in a state-owned enterprise if they were matched by their parents,
but there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in whether a rural husband started his ﬁrst job in a
township or village enterprise. Neither is there signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the husband's belief
on providing old age support between parent- and self-matches.
Wives in parent-matched marriages have 2.4 fewer years of education, are less likely to
work outside home, and earn less annual income. Parent-matched wives are more likely to be
submissive than self-matched wives by 1/3 standard deviation. These signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between self- and parent-matched couples suggest serious selection of parental matchmaking
by individual characteristics. That being said, parental matchmaking is associated with
lower values in indicators of local development as well. Parent-matched marriages are more
likely to appear in places where the norm of parental matchmaking is stronger, the average
income is lower, and the average schooling is lower. Given the rigid hukou system in China
and the lack of migration in 1990, these geographic diﬀerences are likely beyond the control
of any individual in our sample.
Table 2 examines the assortative matching property between husband schooling and wife
schooling. If parental matchmaking is mainly used as the last resort when an unattractive
man could not ﬁnd a wife by himself, parental matchmaking should be negatively correlated
with husband schooling at the individual level (as we have seen in Table 1), but the market-
wide proportion of parental matchmaking should not correlate with the assortative matching
between husband and wife schooling. On the other hand, if parents engage in matchmaking
with an eye on the traits of the daughter-in-law that may help them obtain more parental
goods, they may intentionally reinforce or weaken the assortative matching in schooling.
Deﬁning each marriage market by province-urban-age, Table 2 shows that a husband and
a wife are much less assortatively matched if the market has a stronger norm for parental
matchmaking. In other words, parents of a highly educated man may prefer a daughter-in-
law of lower education than what will arise in a self-matched market. This result is signiﬁcant
and robust even after we control for the average schooling of the province-urban-age cell,
which is likely to indicate the educational and economic development of that market.
Using the husband sample, Table 3 shows a linear-probability estimation on the de-
terminants of parental matchmaking.13 Starting from a benchmark regression in Column
(1), we progressively add the instruments (ParentMatchedm, Job0, and ParentMatchedm ·
Schooling) in Columns (2), (3) and (4). As expected, local social norm in parental match-
making is strongly and positively correlated with individual choices of parental matchmaking
even after we control for many observable husband and local attributes. The type of ﬁrst
13Similar results are found when using probit.
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job seems to matter too, where a rural man who started his ﬁrst job in a town and village
enterprise is less likely to use parental matchmaking. The schooling variables, however, do
not exhibit any signiﬁcant impact on whether a son uses parental help in matching, which
is still true when alternative schooling categories are used. An explanation for this lack of
eﬀect is that the human capital variable in our model is much more general than formal
schooling; it also includes a person's character and charisma, which are often unobservable
but inﬂuential in matchmaking. This is why we need to use instruments to control for the
selection eﬀect.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Love and Joint Income
We ﬁrst show how parental matchmaking relates to marital harmony and joint couple income.
To isolate the eﬀects of parental matchmaking, we include a long list of control variables:
the husband's (1) own age (in log) and schooling;14 (2) parents' schooling; (3) political
aﬃliation with the Communist Party; (4) religion dummies (Muslim, Christian, Buddhist)
and ethnicity dummies (Hui, Korean, Manchu, or other minorities); (5) current job type (10
dummies); and (6) local development as measured by the average income and schooling in
the district or township where the couple live.15 Rural and urban regions diﬀer greatly in
marriage markets, but the husband's current job type already accounts for the rural-urban
diﬀerence hence we do not report a separate coeﬃcient on the rural dummy.
The key-right-hand side variable is parental matchmaking. As discussed in Section 2, a
less competent son with more competent parents is more likely to rely on parental search.
This is why we control for both child and parent characteristics in the regression. Neverthe-
less, selection based on unobservable individual characteristics is still likely. To deal with
such individual-level selections, Table 4A ﬁrst reports the OLS result and then progressively
use ParentMatchedm, Job0, and both as instruments for the matchmaking choice. The ﬁrst
four columns focus on harmony, while the last four columns focus on log joint couple income.
All standard errors are White-corrected and clustered at the district/township level since we
have local income and schooling controls at this level. The ﬁrst-stage Kleibergen-Paap Wald
Rank (KPWR) F statistics and the AR weak-instrument robust test (Finlay and Magnus-
son, 2009) are reported at the bottom of each IV column. Whenever we use more than one
14We got similar results when including age and age squared instead.
15The average income and schooling are computed based on sample information. We exclude the self in
computing the local average to avoid artiﬁcial correlation of these variables and the outcomes of an individual.
We have also tried including other variables such as the ﬁrm ownership dummies of the husband's ﬁrst job.
Their inclusion did not aﬀect any of our key results.
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instruments, we report the p-value for Hansen's J test for over-identiﬁcation.
Parental matchmaking is robustly correlated with lower marital harmony. The coeﬃcient
of ParentMatched is negative and signiﬁcant in the OLS regression. The instrumental vari-
able estimate is again negative, more pronounced in magnitude, and statistically signiﬁcant
in all three columns of the IV results. The KPWR F-statistics and the AR weak instrument
test suggest that both ParentMatchedm and Job0 have enough power to function as instru-
ments. The p-value of Hansen's J statistics also suggests a pass of the over-identiﬁcation
test. According to the IV estimate in Column 4, increasing ParentMatched by one stan-
dard deviation (0.47) would lead to a drop in Harmony by 2.54 standard deviation. The
results are consistent with the agency model where parents' emphasis on sharable marriage
production leads to a sacriﬁce in non-sharable outcomes such as marital harmony.
On joint couple income, the IV results suggest that ParentMatched has a negative eﬀect
over the whole sample and the sign of this result is robust to diﬀerent instruments. At
the ﬁrst glance, this is at odds with our previous work on the urban sample of the same
survey (Huang, Jin and Xu, 2012). Further study shows that this diﬀerence is driven by
the urban-rural distinction. In Table 4B, we repeat the OLS and IV estimation (using
both ParentMatchedm and Job0 as instruments) but include an interaction of the rural
dummy and ParentMatched. While parent-matched couples suﬀer from lower harmony in
both rural and urban areas, ParentMatched has a positive eﬀect on joint couple income
in urban areas but a negative eﬀect in rural areas. The IV results suggest that an increase
in ParentMatched by one standard deviation for urban areas would lead to an increase in
couple income by 0.2 standard deviations, consistent with Huang, Jin and Xu (2012). For
rural areas, the corresponding eﬀect is a drop in couple income by 0.3 standard deviations.
The rural-urban distinction reﬂects diﬀerent patterns of parental goods and diﬀerent
institutional constraints. First, in urban areas, market opportunities are more abundant
for both labor and services such as meals, laundry and care-giving, yet the enforcement of
one-child policy is more stringent. Both factors contribute to urban couples relying more
on monetary income (relative to household production) to deliver parental goods. As a
consequence, parents in their self-interest would want to ensure that the marriage yields
relatively high income. In contrast, in rural areas, there are fewer opportunities to make
money and buy services (at least during our sample period of early 1990s); but there are
more opportunities to evade the one-child policy. As a result, rural parents rely more on
married children to provide parental goods directly. We thus witness a substitution of market
production by household production in rural areas, which explains the negative eﬀect of
parental matchmaking on (market) couple income in rural areas.16
16The rural-urban separation also helps to explain why the Hansen's J statistics do not pass the over-
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4.2 Wife Schooling, Labor Market Participation, Income and Submissiveness
To ensure the provision of parental goods, parents may prefer certain traits in the daughter-
in-law. Such traits may be proxied directly by wife schooling, or reﬂected indirectly by
wife-related marriage outcomes such as wife's labor market participation, income and sub-
missiveness. Since some wife traits may conﬂict with each otherfor example, a highly-
educated wife may bring more labor market income to the household but do fewer household
chores and tend to be less submissive in the household; what traits are more preferable by
parents via parental matchmaking remains an open empirical question.
Table 5 reports the OLS and IV results on wife schooling. Because wife schooling is
pre-determined before marriage, as discussed earlier, there is a potential general equilibrium
problem if we only use market-wide social norm (ParentMatchedm) as the instrument. We
address it by also using Job0 and ParentMatchedm · Schoolingim as individual-level instru-
ments for ParentMatchedim and ParentMatchedim · Schoolingim. While the IV coeﬃcient
on ParentMatchedim alone may confound the true eﬀect with the market-wide unobserved
traditional value on female education, the negative IV coeﬃcient of ParentMatchedim ·
Schoolingim suggests that parental involvement reduces the assortative matching between
husband schooling and wife schooling, which is consistent with the market-wide evidence
presented in Table 2. The optimal individual selection model cannot explain why a man fac-
ing the same distribution of wife schooling tends to prefer a less-educated wife when parental
matchmaking is more prevalent in the marriage market, but the inﬂuence of parental pref-
erence can do so.
Table 6 looks at a wife's annual income and labor participation directly. As described in
Section 3, a rural wife's labor participation is deﬁned by whether her reported annual income
is above 1,500 yuan; this threshold is lowered to 1,000 yuan in the alternative measure. An
urban wife's labor participation is deﬁned by whether she has a job outside home. Overall,
parent-matched wives earn signiﬁcantly less and are less likely to participate in the labor
market. This ﬁnding is signiﬁcant in both OLS and IV speciﬁcations. One explanation is
that wives in parent-matched marriages are less able to earn income from the labor market,
as suggested by their lower schooling (Table 5). Another possibility is that they tend to spe-
cialize more in household production, which is consistent with parents' interest in household
services.
To check whether parental matchmaking favors a submissive wife, a key condition for
delivering parental goods in traditional societies, Table 7 reports regression results ﬁrst on
identiﬁcation test in the full sample for joint couple income (Table 4A). Once we account for the rural-urban
diﬀerence, the Hansen's J statistics are no longer signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence level for joint couple
income (Table 4B).
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the aggregate measure of Wife Submissiveness, and then on the three speciﬁc measures
separately. The correlation of ParentMatched with the overall Wife Submissiveness is pos-
itive and marginally signiﬁcant. After instrumenting ParentMatched, the eﬀect becomes
signiﬁcant at conventional levels and larger in magnitude.
The rest of Table 7 relates ParentMatched to Woman Career Not Important, No Good
Male Friend, and Cannot Reject Sex. Results suggest that parent-matched wives tend to
emphasize less on women's careers. Further analysis suggests that this is mostly driven by
rural wives, while urban wives in parent-matched marriages do not diﬀer from other marriages
in terms of downgrading the importance of women's careers.17 Again, this is consistent
with endogenous preference (Becker, 1996): in urban areas where market opportunities are
greater for women and many household services can be outsourced to the market, less career
discouragement is imposed on women; in rural areas where market opportunities are less for
women and parental goods rely on within-household services, parents discourage women's
market value more. Turning to No Good Male Friend, parent-matched wives are more likely
to believe that a married woman should not have good male friends. This attitude/preference
is consistent with more marriage stability and more attention to household production.
After all, outside friendship with the opposite sex could lead to more time spent outside
the household or emotional distraction, both of which may destabilize marriage and reduce
the returns of investments that parents have already made in ﬁnding the suitable mate for
their son. In both OLS and IV regressions, we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation between
ParentMatched and whether the wife believes that she should not reject sex requests by
her husband. Nevertheless, we do observe a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in fertility between parent-
and self-matched marriages, which we will describe below.
4.3 Fertility and Belief in Old Age Support
Parents may beneﬁt directly from a greater number of grandchildren by enjoying the pleasure
of companionship, help, and simply the altruistic impulse of seeing them growing (my genes
are alive and well in them). In modern society where adult children are often busy working,
grandchildren become regular companions for grandparents at home, and make them feel
more valuable to family. Admittedly, high fertility may dilute resources available to everyone
else in the family, but the cost of bearing and raising more kids may fall disproportionally
on parents than on grandparents: for example, having more children means more eﬀort
at childcare and less market participation at least by mothers, while the beneﬁts of more
children are enjoyed more directly by grandparents. Indirectly, altruistic parents may view
17Results are available upon request.
27
more grandchildren as a warranty for their son's old age support, and thus prefer the couple
to have more children.
Table 8 reports three panels of results on the eﬀects of parental matchmaking on fertility.
Given the imperfect enforcement of the one-child policy in rural areas, it is common to
have two children, so the margin for parents to push is on the third child.18 Traditional
family value also suggests that parents may prefer grandsons to granddaughters (i.e., son
preference), especially if they can instill this preference through selecting a more obedient
daughter-in-law before marriage and push for having a boy after marriage. Consistent with
our expectation, both the OLS and IV results suggest that parent-matched couples have
more children and are more likely to have at least one boy.
BMS (2015) suggests that parents in need of old age support have incentives to induce
more altruistic preference from their sons, in order to ensure smooth and committed delivery
of old age support. To check this argument, we examine how husband belief in old age
support diﬀers across parent- and self-matched marriages. In the OLS results of Table 9,
ParentMatched is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with Providing Old Age Support .
When we use the instrument, the coeﬃcient remains signiﬁcant and of a large magnitude.
According to the IV results, a one-standard-deviation increase in ParentMatched (0.47) is
associated with a higher probability of parent-matched husbands to believe in Providing Old
Age Support by 0.8 standard deviation. This evidence is consistent with BMS (2015).
5 Conclusion
While many economic studies have examined various aspects of marriages, little attention
has been paid to the role that parents play in their children's marriage formation, to how
various matchmaking means aﬀect the selection of spouse and marriage outcomes, and to
how institutional diﬀerences such as the provision of old age support shape the eﬀect of
matchmaking means. In this paper, we use unique data on Chinese households in the early
1990s to examine what types of people use parental matchmaking (versus relying on self
matches), and how parental matchmaking aﬀects marriage harmony, income, fertility, the
belief in providing old age support, and wife traits that are conducive to the delivery of
parental goods.
In a simple theoretical framework, we show that parental matchmaking may distort
the son's optimal spouse selection because parents emphasize a potential wife's ability and
temperament for providing sharable household goods, and downplay the love or emotional
chemistry within the couple. Put diﬀerently, relative to the son, parents are more willing to
18Three or more children is much less likely in urban (6.3%) than in rural areas (23.5%).
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substitute love within the couple for sharable parental goods (including old age support).
We ﬁnd supporting evidence for the model: parental matchmaking is associated with less
marital harmony within the couple, more submissive wives, less labor market participation
of wives, lower wife income, a greater number of children, a higher likelihood of having any
boy, and the husband's stronger belief in providing old age support. These results render
support to the view of BMS (2015) that parents would meddle with children's preferences
to ensure their commitment to providing parental goods such as old age support.
We also ﬁnd suggestive evidence that urban and rural areas use diﬀerent supporting
mechanisms for parental goods. In urban areas, with more labor market opportunities and
more stringent enforcement of the one-child policy, parents rely more on the monetary income
channel to ensure old age support, and as a result, parental matchmaking is associated with
higher joint couple income (Huang et al., 2012). In contrast, in rural areas, labor market
opportunities are fewer and it is easier to evade the one-child policy. As a result, parents
rely more on household production, and joint income tends to be lower for parent matched
couples than for self-matched couples in rural areas. The rural-urban diﬀerence is consistent
with an insight from Cheung (1972): institutions often evolve to serve the prevalent needs
of economic players. Here, parental matchmaking is conducive to the delivery of parental
goods: when market is less eﬀective, parental matchmaking is more likely to be adopted to
ensure that parental goods are adequately provided by married children.
Overall, our analysis suggests that parental matchmaking introduces an interesting trade-
oﬀ. On the one hand, it entails agency costs in terms of less love within the couple. On
the other hand, it helps to ensure parental goods for the matchmaking parents, and a more
harmonious inter-generational relationship. Since our sample period, China has evolved
towards more state-provided pension and health insurance for rural households and the
urban poor. As more and more old age support is provided outside household, and more labor
market opportunities arise even for rural people through means such as migration, traditional
values such as ﬁlial piety and submissiveness of children may become less important for
parents and increasingly unproductive for the society as a whole (e.g, it may discourage
risk-taking and innovation among the young), not to mention that it is also more diﬃcult
to enforce such values when inter-generational cohabitation becomes rarer. If our theory is
right, we expect parental matchmaking to play diﬀerent roles in this transition. After all,
with more old age support from the society and more market oﬀering for household services,
parents have less need to manipulate children's preferences or to select submissive but less
capable (in market production) daughters-in-law. This topic warrants future research.
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Appendix A: Proof of Propositions
The optimal values of α∗ and h∗f are jointly determined by (1) and (2). Note that α
∗ can be
solved from condition (1) as a function of h∗f , which can then be plugged in (2) to solve h
∗
f .
The optimal values of α∗∗ and h∗∗f are jointly determined by (3) and (4), based on which we
get ∂α∗∗/∂hp > 0 and ∂h∗∗f /∂hp > 0 by Cramer's rule:
∂α∗∗
∂hp
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(−)
ηps13
(+)
δf1 − ηps12
ηps23
(−)
[γ + δ(β + α∗∗)]f11 − ηps22
(−)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ /|H| > 0,
∂h∗∗f
∂hp
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(−)−ηps11 (−)ηps13
δf1 − ηps12
(+)
ηps23
(−)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ /|H| > 0,
where |H| is the determinant of Hessian matrix
|H| =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(−)−ηps11
(+)
δf1 − ηps12
δf1 − ηps12
(+)
[γ + δ(β + α∗∗)]f11 − ηps22
(−)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
and |H| > 0 is assumed for the existence of optimal solutions. We can also get ∂α∗∗/∂γ > 0
and ∂h∗∗f /∂γ in a similar way. We assume δf1 − ηps12 ≥ 0, which essentially means that
∂2U˜/∂α∂hf ≥ 0; and then based on (3) we have
∂α∗∗
∂hf
=
δf1(h
∗
f , hm)− ηps12(α∗, h∗f , hm)
s11
> 0.
Comparing conditions (1) and (3), we can see that α∗(hf ) > α∗∗(hf ) must hold, con-
ditional on the same level of hf ; the reason is that the ﬁrst terms in both conditions are
independent of α while the second terms are strictly increasing in it, which combined with
the assumption ηps1 ≥ δηmc1 will lead to α∗(hf ) > α∗∗(hf ). Given the same α, we may have
h∗f > h
∗∗
f if γ < (1− δ)(β + α) and/or ηmc2 ≤ ηps2, in other words, if parents do not beneﬁt
too much from the daughter-in-law's human capital hf or if their marginal searching cost
with respect to hf is not lower than the son's. The opposite result h
∗
f ≤ h∗∗f is otherwise
possible.
Since the searching cost is always positive,
(β + α∗)f(h∗f , hm) > (β + α
∗∗)f(h∗∗f , hm) (6)
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must hold, which then implies α∗ > α∗∗ and α∗f(h∗f , hm) > α
∗∗f(h∗∗f , hm); the reason is as
follows. (i) If h∗f > h
∗∗
f , then α
∗(h∗f ) > α
∗∗(h∗f ) > α
∗∗(h∗∗f ) holds, and it implies α
∗ > α∗∗,
where the ﬁrst inequality follows α∗(hf ) > α∗∗(hf ) and the second follows ∂α∗∗(hf )/∂hf > 0.
And α∗f(h∗f , hm) > α
∗∗f(h∗∗f , hm) follows directly from h
∗
f > h
∗∗
f and α
∗ > α∗∗. (ii) If
h∗f ≤ h∗∗f , then we have
(β + α∗)f(h∗∗f , hm) ≥ (β + α∗)f(h∗f , hm) > (β + α∗∗)f(h∗∗f , hm),
where the ﬁrst and third terms imply α∗ > α∗∗ ; the ﬁrst inequality holds because h∗f ≤ h∗∗f ,
while the second inequality is based on (6). And following similar arguments we can derive
α∗f(h∗f , hm) > α
∗∗f(h∗∗f , hm) by comparing the ﬁrst and third terms in
βf(h∗∗f , hm) + α
∗f(h∗f , hm) ≥ (β + α∗)f(h∗f , hm) > (β + α∗∗)f(h∗∗f , hm).
Based on (5), the utility diﬀerence between self and parents' searching is
pi ≡ U∗ − U∗∗ = (β + α∗)f(h∗f , hm)− ηmc(α∗, h∗f , hm)− (β + α∗∗)f(h∗∗f , hm),
which is strictly decreasing in hp because
∂pi/∂hp = −f(h∗∗f , hm)∂α∗∗/∂hp − (β + α∗∗)f1(h∗∗f , hm)∂h∗∗f /∂hp < 0.
We get ∂pi/∂hm > 0 for the following reason. Note that
∂pi/∂hm =
∂U∗
∂hm
− ∂(β + α∗∗)f(h∗∗f , hm)/∂hm,
where
∂U∗
∂hm
=
∂(β + α∗)f(h∗f , hm)
∂hm
− ∂ηmc(α
∗, h∗f , hm)
∂hm
(7)
= (β + α∗)f2(h∗f , hm)− ηmc3(α∗, h∗f , hm) > 0 (8)
by the Envelop Theorem. Since
∂2U∗
∂hm∂α
= α∗f2(h∗f , hm)− ηmc31(α∗, h∗f , hm) > 0,
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we have
∂U∗
∂hm
|(α∗,h∗f ) >
∂U∗
∂hm
|(α∗∗,h∗f ) > ∂(β + α∗∗)f(h∗f , hm)/∂hm, (9)
where the ﬁrst inequality is because α∗ > α∗∗, and the second inequality is because the
second term of ∂U
∗
∂hm
in (8) is positive. (i) If h∗f > h
∗∗
f , then ∂
2(β + α)f(hf , hm)/∂hm∂hf =
f12(hf , hm) > 0 implies
∂(β + α∗∗)f(h∗f , hm)/∂hm > ∂(β + α
∗∗)f(h∗∗f , hm)/∂hm,
which combined with the inequality in (9) implies
∂U∗
∂hm
|(α∗,h∗f ) > ∂(β + α∗∗)f(h∗∗f , hm)/∂hm,
and this leads to
∂pi/∂hm =
∂U∗
∂hm
− ∂(β + α∗∗)f(h∗∗f , hm)/∂hm > 0.
(ii) When h∗f ≤ h∗∗f is the case, the result can be derived in a similar way due to
∂(β + α∗∗)f(h∗∗f , hm)
∂hm
<
∂(β + α∗)f(h∗∗f , hm)
∂hm
− ∂ηmc(α
∗, h∗f , hm)
∂hm
<
∂U∗
∂hm
|(α∗,h∗f ),
where the ﬁrst inequality holds because of α∗∗ < α∗ and −∂ηmc(α∗, h∗f , hm)/∂hm > 0, while
the second inequality holds because (α∗, h∗f ) is the optimal choice to maximize U
∗ than
(α∗, h∗∗f ); comparing the ﬁrst and the third terms we get ∂pi/∂hm > 0.
So the threshold h#p is uniquely determined by
pi = (β + α∗)f(h∗f , hm)− ηmc(α∗, h∗f , hm)− (β + α∗∗(h#p ))f(h∗∗f (h#p ), hm) = 0.
Based on this identity, we get
∂h#p
∂hm
= −∂pi/∂hm
∂pi/∂hp
> 0,
∂h#p
∂γ
= − ∂pi/∂γ
∂pi/∂hp
= −f(h
∗∗
f , hm)∂α
∗∗/∂γ + (β + α∗∗)f1(h∗∗f , hm)∂h
∗∗
f /∂γ
−∂pi/∂hp < 0,
∂h#p
∂ηm
= −∂pi/∂ηm
∂pi/∂hp
=
−c(α∗, h∗f , hm)
−∂pi/∂hp < 0.
The comparative statics for the threshold level h#m can be derived in a similar manner.
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Figure 1: Theoretical Predication on the Son’s Optimal Choice of Matchmaking Method 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics and Comparison by Status of Parental Matchmaking 
 
Pooled 
Parent  
matched 
Self 
matched 
Difference 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) = (2) – (3) 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Diff S.D. t-stat 
Parent Matched  0.338 0.473        
Parent Matched Norm 0.351 0.188 0.450 0.163 0.300 0.179 0.149 0.005 32.366 
Couple outcomes          
Harmony  1.015 0.715 0.968 0.707 1.038 0.718 -0.070 0.019 3.600 
No conflicts  0.253 0.435 0.224 0.417 0.268 0.443 -0.044 0.012 3.843 
Ln(Couple annual income) 8.752 1.195 8.226 1.031 9.020 1.183 -0.795 0.030 26.379 
Number of children  1.646 1.025 1.895 1.075 1.518 0.974 0.376 0.027 14.039 
Three or more children   0.162 0.369 0.241 0.428 0.122 0.327 0.118 0.010 12.237 
Having a boy   0.676 0.468 0.753 0.431 0.637 0.481 0.117 0.012 9.446 
Husband characteristics          
Age      34.892 6.291 34.556 6.366 35.064 6.246 -0.508 0.167 3.041 
Schooling      8.718 3.218 7.677 3.153 9.249 3.120 -1.572 0.083 18.903 
Mother schooling  2.196 3.163 1.445 2.559 2.580 3.367 -1.134 0.083 13.701 
Father schooling    4.310 3.719 3.322 3.330 4.815 3.806 -1.493 0.097 15.395 
Communist Party member    0.204 0.403 0.140 0.347 0.237 0.425 -0.098 0.011 9.177 
Age at first marriage  24.874 3.490 23.811 3.306 25.417 3.457 -1.606 0.090 17.742 
Rural*First job was in TVEs 0.061 0.240 0.067 0.251 0.058 0.235 0.009 0.006 1.384 
Urban*First job was in SOEs 0.169 0.375 0.079 0.270 0.215 0.411 -0.136 0.010 13.828 
Belief in providing old age        
support 
0.447 0.497 0.446 0.497 0.448 0.497 -0.003 0.013 0.195 
Wife traits          
Wife schooling   7.350 3.859 5.736 3.809 8.174 3.618 -2.438 0.098 24.919 
Wife work   0.686 0.464 0.513 0.500 0.776 0.417 -0.263 0.013 21.029 
Ln(wife annual income)   7.223 0.821 6.935 0.852 7.369 0.765 -0.433 0.021 20.208 
Wife submissiveness (total) 1.036 0.882 1.232 0.901 0.937 0.855 0.295 0.023 12.651 
Wife career unimportant 0.184 0.387 0.232 0.422 0.159 0.366 0.073 0.010 7.103 
No good male friend 0.386 0.487 0.484 0.500 0.336 0.472 0.148 0.013 11.525 
Cannot reject sex  0.469 0.499 0.517 0.500 0.445 0.497 0.072 0.013 5.430 
Township characteristics          
Rural  0.576 0.494 0.819 0.385 0.453 0.498 0.366 0.012 29.779 
Ln(avg individual income at 
township level)  
8.151 1.075 7.661 0.860 8.401 1.087 -0.740 0.027 27.407 
Average years of schooling at 
township level  
7.812 2.371 6.682 2.018 8.389 2.330 -1.707 0.059 28.837 
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Table 2. Assortative Matching and Social Norms 
 
Correlation between  
husband schooling and wife schooling 
Local parental matchmaking norm -0.481*** -0.395** 
 (0.079) (0.188) 
Average schooling for the region-cohort cell  0.007 
  (0.014) 
Intercept 0.495*** 0.410** 
 (0.033) (0.172) 
Number of observations 142 142 
Adjusted R2 0.206 0.201 
Note: Unit of observation is province-urban-AgeCohort. Cohorts are classified by age: <=22, then 23-25, 26-28, …, 
50-52, 53-55, and 56-71. The few oldest cohorts cover a larger age span because of the limitations of cell sizes. * 
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. 
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Table 3. Determinants of Matchmaking Methods 
 
 Parent Matched 
 
Rural 0.180*** 0.024 0.054 0.063 
 (0.065) (0.069) (0.072) (0.074) 
Husband Characteristics     
Ln(age) 0.129*** 0.038 0.036 (0.074) 
 (0.040) (0.043) (0.044) 0.032 
Schooling -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 (0.043) 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 0.002 
Mother schooling 0.001 0.000 0.001 (0.003) 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 0.000 
Father schooling -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 (0.002) 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) -0.003 
Communist Party Member -0.007 -0.017 -0.019 (0.002) 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) -0.020 
Being a Muslin 0.059 0.016 0.020 0.018 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) 
Being a Christian 0.022 0.038 0.036 0.036 
 (0.086) (0.085) (0.084) (0.084) 
Being a Buddhist 0.169*** 0.136 0.135 0.133 
 (0.063) (0.082) (0.082) (0.084) 
Korean ethnicity 0.228** 0.175** 0.172** 0.175* 
 (0.089) (0.088) (0.086) (0.089) 
Manchurian ethnicity 0.119* 0.058 0.060 0.060 
 (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) 
Township characteristics     
Ln(avg income per capita in the township) -0.034* -0.018 -0.017 -0.016 
 (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Average schooling in the township -0.014 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Social norm and initial jobs     
Local parental matchmaking norm  0.628*** 0.596*** 0.734*** 
  (0.145) (0.146) (0.157) 
Local parental matchmaking norm*Schooling    -0.018 
    (0.014) 
Rural*First job was TVE   -0.060* -0.057* 
   (0.031) (0.031) 
Urban*First job was SOE   0.022 0.022 
   (0.014) (0.014) 
Number of observations / Adjusted R2 6,334 / 0.138 6,334 / 0.147 6,334 / 0.148 6,334 / 0.148 
P-value of (joint) significance of “social norm” (and 
if applicable) and initial jobs 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. All columns control for Hui ethnicity and other minority ethnicity, and both 
are statistically insignificant.  
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Table 4A. Parental Matchmaking, Love, and Money 
 Harmony Log (couple income) 
 OLS IV IV IV OLS IV IV IV 
Parent-matched -0.049* -1.189*** -1.151* -1.192*** -0.025 -0.163 -1.155** -0.275* 
 (0.029) (0.452) (0.692) (0.407) (0.019) (0.161) (0.514) (0.157) 
Ln(husband age) 0.135* 0.271** 0.266** 0.271*** 0.172*** 0.190*** 0.321*** 0.205*** 
 (0.079) (0.107) (0.118) (0.104) (0.040) (0.048) (0.087) (0.048) 
Husband schooling 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Husband’s mother schooling 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
Husband’s father schooling -0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.004 0.003 -0.000 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Husband is Communist Party 
member 
0.015 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.065*** 0.073*** 
 (0.030) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.012) (0.012) (0.021) (0.013) 
Ln (township income per capita) 0.042 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.970*** 0.966*** 0.935*** 0.962*** 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.036) (0.033) (0.011) (0.012) (0.031) (0.013) 
Average township schooling -0.026 -0.048** -0.047 -0.048** -0.005 -0.007 -0.020 -0.008 
 (0.022) (0.024) (0.029) (0.024) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) 
Husband’s religion, ethnicity, and 
current job type dummies 
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
IVs  Norm Job0 
Norm+ 
Job0 
 Norm Job0 
Norm+ 
Job0 
P-value for Hansen’s J   0.264 0.534   0.092 0.014 
KP rk Wald F  21.69 4.58 9.33  17.75 3.72 7.91 
AR weak IV test, p-value  0.009 0.083 0.004  0.318 0.003 0.006 
P-value, joint significance of current 
job status dummies 
0.786 0.673 0.773 0.635 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Number of observations 6,050 6,050 6,050 6,050 6,334 6,334 6,334 6,334 
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.015 - - 0.848 0.848 0.686 0.849 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. White corrected standard errors clustered at the township level in parentheses. The IVs labelled “Job0” are defined 
as urban*the first job of the husband was in an SOE, and rural*the first job of the husband was in a TVE (i.e., township and village enterprises). Current job 
type includes 10 dummies: urban*the current job of the husband was in an SOE or a collective firm, a privately owned firm, a foreign firm, or other ownership 
types; rural*the current job of the husband was in household production, in farming, in household non-agricultural activities, in a TVE, in other activities. 
These current job type dummies absorb the rural dummy. 
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Table 4B. Parent Matchmaking, Love, and Money: Rural and Urban Areas Separated 
 Harmony Log(joint income) 
 OLS IV OLS IV 
Parent-matched -0.095* -1.805** -0.000 0.442** 
 (0.049) (0.730) (0.015) (0.205) 
Parent-matched*rural 0.065 0.746 -0.034 -0.874*** 
 (0.060) (0.738) (0.029) (0.219) 
Ln (husband age) 0.135* 0.278*** 0.172*** 0.198*** 
 (0.079) (0.103) (0.040) (0.051) 
Husband schooling 0.001 -0.003 0.021*** 0.019*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) 
Husband’s mother schooling 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
Husband’s father schooling -0.000 -0.003 0.004 0.003 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) 
Husband is Communist Party 
member 
0.016 0.012 0.075*** 0.066*** 
 (0.030) (0.038) (0.012) (0.014) 
Ln (township income per capita) 0.043 0.015 0.970*** 0.955*** 
 (0.032) (0.033) (0.011) (0.014) 
Average township schooling -0.026 -0.044* -0.005 -0.013 
 (0.023) (0.024) (0.007) (0.008) 
Husband’s religion, ethnicity, and 
current job type dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IVs  Norm, Norm*rural, Job0  Norm, Norm*rural, Job0 
P-value for Hansen’s J  0.795  0.102 
Number of observations 6,050 6,050 6,334 6,334 
Adjusted R2 0.015 - 0.858 0.835 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. White corrected standard errors clustered at the township level in parentheses. The rural dummy is absorbed by 
current job type dummies. 
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Table 5. Parent Matchmaking and Wife Schooling  
 Wife Schooling Wife Schooling 
 OLS IV OLS IV 
Parent-matched -0.453*** -3.510** -0.055 -2.270** 
 (0.077) (1.408) (0.271) (1.084) 
Parent-matched*Husband schooling   -0.049* -0.138* 
   (0.029) (0.077) 
Ln(husband age) -3.653*** -3.252*** -3.664*** -3.298*** 
 (0.352) (0.341) (0.352) (0.328) 
Husband schooling 0.250*** 0.234*** 0.268*** 0.286*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.020) (0.028) 
Husband’s mother schooling 0.029* 0.031** 0.027* 0.026* 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Husband’s father schooling 0.028** 0.019 0.029** 0.021 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) 
Husband is Communist Party member 0.261*** 0.233** 0.256** 0.220** 
 (0.100) (0.103) (0.100) (0.104) 
Ln(township income per capita)    0.020 -0.075 0.022 -0.064 
      (0.086) (0.077) (0.087) (0.076) 
Average township schooling 0.909*** 0.868*** 0.909*** 0.870*** 
      (0.069) (0.068) (0.069) (0.069) 
Husband’s religion, ethnicity, and current 
job type dummies  
yes yes yes yes 
IVs  Norm+Job0  Norm+Job0 
P-value for Hansen’s J  0.022  0.322 
Number of observations 6,334 6,334 6,334 6,334 
Adjusted R2 0.538 - 0.539 - 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. White corrected standard errors clustered at the township level in parentheses. The rural dummy is absorbed 
by current job type dummies. 
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Table 6. Parent Matchmaking, Wife Income and Wife Labor Market Participation  
 Log(wife annual income) Wife labor participation 
Wife labor participation: 
alternative definition 
 OLS IV OLS/ IV OLS IV 
Parent-matched -0.072** -3.562*** -0.047*** -1.010*** -0.031* -1.040*** 
 (0.031) (0.902) (0.014) (0.323) (0.016) (0.280) 
Ln(husband age) 0.678*** 1.104*** 0.222*** 0.353*** 0.122*** 0.255*** 
 (0.100) (0.195) (0.047) (0.074) (0.031) (0.064) 
Husband schooling 0.021*** 0.002 0.008*** 0.003 0.007** 0.001 
 (0.005) (0.012) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Husband’s mother schooling 0.007 0.011 0.003 0.003 -0.000 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
Husband’s father schooling 0.009*** -0.003 0.004** 0.000 0.003* -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Husband is Communist Party member -0.048* -0.096* 0.002 -0.011 -0.007 -0.016 
 (0.026) (0.055) (0.014) (0.022) (0.009) (0.019) 
Ln(township income per capita)    0.315*** 0.211*** 0.116*** 0.087*** 0.100*** 0.069*** 
      (0.088) (0.076) (0.035) (0.028) (0.021) (0.019) 
Average township schooling 0.057* 0.013 0.027 0.013 0.037*** 0.023 
      (0.034) (0.047) (0.017) (0.019) (0.012) (0.014) 
Husband’s religion, ethnicity, and 
current job type dummies  
yes yes yes yes yes yes 
IVs  Norm+Job0  Norm+Job0  Norm+Job0 
P-value for Hansen’s J  0.322  0.339  0.443 
Number of observations 6,154 6,154 5,663 5,663 6,334 6,334 
Adjusted R2 0.400  0.553  0.217  
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. White corrected standard errors clustered at the township level in parentheses. The rural dummy is 
absorbed by current job type dummies.  
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Table 7. Parent Matchmaking and Wife Submissiveness  
 
Wife Submissiveness 
(overall) 
Wife Career Not 
Important 
No Good Male Friend Cannot Reject Sex 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Parent-matched 0.059* 1.982*** 0.007 0.610*** 0.050*** 1.026*** -0.000 0.358 
 (0.031) (0.674) (0.016) (0.212) (0.018) (0.367) (0.015) (0.275) 
Ln(husband age) 0.084 -0.160 0.008 -0.071 0.008 -0.122 0.056 0.010 
 (0.092) (0.137) (0.032) (0.047) (0.056) (0.081) (0.048) (0.067) 
Husband schooling -0.007 0.003 -0.002 0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.014) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Husband’s mother schooling -0.006 -0.008 0.003* 0.003 -0.008*** -0.009** -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Husband’s father schooling -0.009** -0.002 -0.005*** -0.003 -0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Husband is Communist party member 0.031 0.049 0.012 0.018 0.050*** 0.059** -0.027* -0.023 
 (0.027) (0.044) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.015) (0.016) 
Ln (township income per capita) -0.132*** -0.079* -0.036*** -0.018 -0.042* -0.014 -0.049** -0.039* 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.013) (0.016) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.021) 
Average township schooling -0.094*** -0.072*** -0.025** -0.017 -0.022 -0.010 -0.042*** -0.038*** 
     (0.028) (0.027) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) 
Husband’s religion, ethnicity, and 
current job type dummies 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IVs  Norm+Job0  Norm+Job0  Norm+Job0  Norm+Job0 
P-value for  Hansen’s J  0.502  0.612  0.279  0.246 
Number of  observations 6,256 6,256 6,334 6,334 6,298 6,298 6,268 6,268 
Adjusted R2 0.135 - 0.056 - 0.082 - 0.042 - 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. White corrected standard errors clustered at the township level in parentheses. The rural dummy is absorbed by current 
job type dummies. 
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Table 8. Parent Matchmaking and Fertility 
 Number of children Having 3+ children Have any boys 
 OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Parent-matched 0.119*** 4.718*** 0.043*** 0.843** 0.027** 0.536** 
 (0.034) (1.257) (0.012) (0.338) (0.012) (0.219) 
Ln(husband age) 1.042*** 0.438 0.432*** 0.327*** 0.536*** 0.470*** 
 (0.209) (0.327) (0.064) (0.089) (0.042) (0.060) 
Husband schooling 0.006 0.030* 0.001 0.006 0.005** 0.008** 
 (0.006) (0.018) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
Husband’s mother schooling -0.011 -0.015 -0.002 -0.002 -0.005* -0.005* 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Husband’s father schooling -0.000 0.014 0.001 0.004 0.004 0.005** 
 (0.006) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Husband is Communist Party member 0.176*** 0.219*** 0.040* 0.047** 0.016 0.021 
 (0.052) (0.081) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) 
Ln(township income per capita) 0.623*** 0.765*** 0.018 0.043 0.015 0.031* 
         (0.107) (0.097) (0.029) (0.029) (0.017) (0.017) 
Average township schooling -0.212*** -0.149** -0.040*** -0.029* -0.047*** -0.040*** 
 (0.047) (0.067) (0.015) (0.017) (0.009) (0.012) 
Religion, ethnicity, current job type dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes 
IVs  Norm+Job0  Norm+Job0  Norm+Job0 
P-value for Hansen’s J  0.413  0.827  0.082 
Number of observations 6,334 6,334 6,334 6,334 6,334 6,334 
Adjusted R2 0.323 - 0.133 - 0.111 - 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. White corrected standard errors clustered at the township level in parentheses. The rural dummy is 
absorbed by current job type dummies. 
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                     Table 9. Parent Matchmaking and Husband’s Belief in Providing Old Age Support 
 Husband’s belief in providing old age support 
 OLS IV 
Parent-matched 0.042** 0.805*** 
 (0.017) (0.301) 
Ln(husband age) -0.121** -0.222*** 
 (0.050) (0.072) 
Husband schooling 0.005 0.009* 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
Husband’s mother schooling -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) 
Husband’s father schooling -0.001 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Husband is Communist Party member 0.046** 0.054** 
 (0.018) (0.022) 
Ln (township income per capital) 0.034 0.058** 
 (0.024) (0.027) 
Average township schooling 0.031** 0.042** 
 (0.015) (0.018) 
Religion, ethnicity, current job type dummies yes yes 
IVs  Norm+Job0 
P-value for Hansen’s J  0.521 
Number of observations 6,300 6,300 
Adjusted R2 0.025 - 
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01. White corrected standard errors clustered at the township level in 
parentheses. The rural dummy is absorbed by current job type dummies. 
 
 
